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We present a new fiber based quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme which can be regarded
as a modification of an idea proposed by Inoue, Waks and Yamamoto (IWY) [1]. The scheme
described here uses a single phase modulator and two differential delay elements in series at the
transmitter that form an interferometer when combined with a third differential delay element at
the receiver. The protocol is characterized by a high efficiency, reduced exposure to an attack by an
eavesdropper, and higher sensitivity to such an attack when compared to other QKD schemes. For
example, the efficiency with which transmitted data contribute to the private key is 3/4 compared
with 1/4 for BB84 [2]. Moreover, an eavesdropper can aquire a maximum of 1/3 of the key which
leads to an error probability in the private key of 1/3. This can be compared to 1/2 and 1/4 for
these same parameters in both BB84 and IWY. The combination of these considerations should lead
to increased range and key distribution rate over present fiber-based QKD schemes.
PACS Numbers: 03.67.-a, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd, 42.79.Sz
The quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme recently
proposed by Inoue, Waks and Yamamoto [1] represents
a new concept that should prove to be a significant ad-
vance for fiber-based QKD. Their scheme, which we label
IWY, is sketched in Fig. 1 for the case of a two delay-
element transmitter. Essentially, a single pulse entering
the transmitter leaves as a superposition of three pulses,
the last two of which have been given a random phase
shift of ∆φ ∈ {0, pi} relative to the first in addition to
a fixed time delay of ∆t and 2∆t relative the time as-
sociated with the input state: The photon pulse is su-
perposed in time and phase. The receiver effects a time
delay of ∆t and causes the superposed pulses to overlap
and hence interfere in the same manner as superposed
pulses in the standard Franson interferometer [3] used in
BB84-like fiber QKD as shown in Fig. 3. (The transmit-
ter and receiver are typically referred to as Alice (A) and
Bob (B) within the quantum information community.)
The advantages of this new scheme are numerous: (I)
the efficiency with which transmitted data contribute to
the private key, which we label ηp the “protocol effi-
ciency,” is increased to ηp = 1 − 1/N , where N is the
number of temporal superpositions leaving the transmit-
ter; (II) the amount of information an eavesdropper (E,
usually Eve) can acquire on the key is reduced as N in-
creases; (III) the maximum error probability caused by
eavesdropping, which we name “disturbance” and label
as pd, increases with N and allows error reconciliation to
be performed on data with a higher initial error probabil-
ity; and (IV) B does not need a phase-modulator (PM).
The implications of these advantages, relating to the
points raised above, are that A and B generate more key
and can tolerate and correct for higher error rates be-
cause: (i) qubits accumulate at a higher rate; (ii) the frac-
tion of key leaked during eavesdropping, ηe, that must be
discarded to ensure the privacy is reduced with increas-
ing N (ηe relates the maximum amount of information E
can acquire on the quantum key in a specified attack on
the quantum channel); (iii) the liklihood of detecting E’s
attacks on the quantum channel is increased as her eaves-
dropping creates a larger disturbance within the qubits;
and (iv) the random choice of ∆φ byB necessary in other
schemes is eliminated in IWY and yields an increase in ηp
over these other schemes (ηp increases more than 300%
for the case of the typical, or current, implementations
of fiber based BB84, e.g. as shown in Fig. 3).
A further consequence of removing the PM from the
receiver is that the typical 3-6 dB loss in PMs is removed
from B’s receiver. Thus, the key rate, robustness against
errors, and distance over which qubits can be transmitted
can be enhanced over currently realized fiber based QKD
systems.
The scheme we introduce here, and labelled BLT and
shown in Fig. 2 for two transmitter delay elements, im-
proves upon IWY in several significant ways while retain-
ing all of IWY’s advantages over other schemes. First,
BLT is simpler to implement because the series-element
construction of BLT can be achieved with simple 50/50
beamsplitters (BSs), while the parallel construction of
IWY requires more specialized BSs to balance the output
pulses’ intensities. Second, the efficiency (ηp), potential
eavesdropper knowledge (ηe) and disturbance (pd) all fa-
vor BLT over IWY for the same number of delay elements
in the transmitter. In BLT, the number N of superposed
pulses increases as N = 2m where m is the number of
delay elements at the transmitter; in IWY N increases
as N = m + 1. For example, the serial scheme of BLT
yields ηp+ ≥ 3/4 while for the parallel scheme of IWY
ηp‖ ≥ 2/3 with the lower bound given by m = 2 in each
case. Moreover, the eavedropper’s potential information
ηe is less in BLT than in IWY, and the disturbance pd
is greater in BLT than in IWY, regardless of the type
of attack employed by E. Third, a single PM outside
the transmitter delay elements further reduces the com-
1
plexity and expense of the system and can increase its
efficiency. For example, it is well-known that QKD is
more secure and more efficient if each superposition of
pulses contains exactly one photon. This would most
likely be realized with a single photon source [4] before
the delay elements and appropriately modified optics as
discussed below. A single PM outside the transmitter de-
lay elements dramatically increases the receiver efficiency
in this situation, again due to the typical 3-6 dB loss of
PMs.
Consider a fiber BB84 system as shown in Fig. 3 in
which A sends single, or weak coherent, photon states
to B [3,5,6]. For each input pulse the phase of A’s
PM is randomly toggled among a choice of four phases:
φA ∈ {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2}. As the pulses arrive atB, the PM
at that end is toggled randomly between φB ∈ {0, pi/2}
for each superposition of pulses to select the measure-
ment basis for that superposition. (B’s delay element
is adjusted so that a phase difference φA − φB = 0
causes always a photodetection at the same detector and
φA−φB = pi causes always a photodetection at the other
detector.) After the weak pulses are exchanged B re-
veals the times when photodetections were observed and
the measurement bases chosen at those times. A notes
when their phases satisfied φA−φB ∈ {0, pi}, and tells B
to discard measurement results which were not collected
when this condition was satified. What remains is poten-
tially secret key in which φA−φB ∈ {0, pi} correspond to
binary values {0, 1}.
The exchanged qubits will undoubtedly contain errors
which must be eliminated through an appropriate error
reconciliation protocol [7,8]. After error reconciliation,
privacy amplification [9] — which is linked to the error
rate — must be applied to the remaining error-free key
to reduce E’s information to an acceptable level. If the
error rate is too high all of the remaining key bits may
be eliminated during this phase. In addition, the channel
must be authenticated [10]; authentication represents an
additional protocol expense.
It is worthwhile to note the fraction of key sent by
A which remains after error reconciliation and privacy
amplification for each of the schemes discussed here. We
label this fraction Rk [12] and find
Rk = ηp(µr − ηe
po
pd
), (1)
where po is the measured error probability per bit in the
key (before error reconciliation), and µr is the fraction of
B’s key material that remains after error reconciliation,
and depends on po. The fraction of the distributed key
that must be discarded through privacy maintenance is
given by ηepo/pd. Although an additional amount of key
must be discarded if weak coherent states of light are
used, this issue is disregarded in the discussion because
n¯ can be made arbitrarily small (in theory at least), and
because other states of light can be employed that are not
susceptible to this type of attack (e.g, entangled photon
sources [13,14], or other single-photon states [4]).
Consider the (typical) fiber based BB84 implementa-
tion described above, and assume that the PM transmis-
sion is unity. This implementation has a receiver effi-
ciency ηp(bb84) = 1/4 [11]: 1/2 from the 50:50 BS at the
input of B’s delay element and 1/2 due to the random
bases choice that is crucial to BB84 security. The ηe and
pd depend on the type of attack used by E. The most
powerful, and yet realistic, attack that has been devised
for this scheme is for E to intercept and resend the pho-
ton pulses in the Breidbart Basis [7]. With this type of
attack, ηe ≤ 0.585 and pd = 1/4. If weak coherent pulses
were used to transmit the key, another fraction n¯/4 of the
key is also potentially compromised to E, where n¯ ≪ 1
is the average number of photons per superposition.
The IWY and BLT schemes accomplish key exchange
in a similar manner. That is, superposed photon pulses
(single-photon or weak-coherent states) are transmitted
from A to B. B’s delay element is adjusted so that a
phase difference ∆φ ∈ {0, pi} between adjacent pulses
in a superposition always cause a photodetection at a
particular detector. After photodetections are observed,
B tells A at what times they were observed relative to
an accepted time standard. Because A knows what the
phases of each superposition were, A knows which of B’s
detectors registered a photodetection.
As mentioned previously, ηp‖ = 2/3 while ηp+ = 3/4
for the implementations of BLT and IWY sketched in
Figs. 1 and 2 respectively. The strongest attack that can
be employed by E is likely an intercept/resend attack.
However, unlike BB84, a Breidbart-like attack is not pos-
sible in IWY or BLT as the measurements are made in
orthogonal bases. For these schemes, the strongest in-
tercept/resend strategy is to build a receiver much like
B, but to replace the first BS with a fast switch (we do
not specify the switch technology, but merely state it is
possible). In this manner, adjacent pulses can be made
to overlap without loss of signal due to the first or last
pulse in the superposition contributing less to the inter-
ference than the central pulses. If exactly one photon
exists in the superposition E will measure one superposi-
tion phase difference (∆φ), but have no knowledge of the
other remaining phase difference(s). Thus E’s knowledge
of the key for the superpositions that are intercepted and
resent, and hence ηe can be calculated as ηe‖ = 1/2 and
ηe+ = 1/3 for the IWY and BLT respectively. The cor-
responding disturbances are pd‖ = 1/4 and pd+ = 1/3.
If the effect of multiple photons in a superposition from
the use of weak coherent states is included, E can know
another fraction of the key equal to n¯/4 or n¯/6 for IWY
or BLT respectively.
An important variation to either the IWY or BLT
scheme is to add a BS and an extra delay element at
the receiver as shown in (Fig. 4). For this system (de-
noted with ⊕), ηp⊕ = 5/8 while ηe⊕ = 1/5 is significantly
reduced, and E’s disturbance to the final key is increased
to as much as pd⊕ = 2/5, if the additional BS is equally
reflecting and transmitting.
With these considerations, ηp ∈ {1/4, 2/3, 3/4, 5/8}
and ηe/pd ∈ {2.34, 2, 1, 1/2} for {BB84, IWY, BLT and
BLT⊕} respectively. The rate at which key is gener-
ated is proportional to Rk and can be approximated
from Fig. 5 where Rk is plotted for the case of µr =
1+ (1− po) log2(1− po) + po log2(po): 1 minus the Shan-
non entropy.
In any case, in a practical QKD system, Rk will be
bounded by the values plotted in Fig. 5 for the four
schemes at the same po. Figure 5 highlights the value
of the relative schemes presented here. For po <∼ 0.13, it
is clear that BLT has a great advantage over the other
three schemes: qubits are collected at a higher rate than
for the other 3 schemes. For po >∼ 0.13, BLT⊕ retains
a significant advantage due to its reduced leakage of
ηe = 1/5, and disturbance pd = 2/5. These facts do
not consider the added complexity of BLT⊕ at B which
includes the second delay element and additional detec-
tors. For simplicity, efficiency, and protection against an
intercept/resend attack by E, BLT offers great advan-
tages over BB84, IWY and BLT⊕.
In conclusion, we have introduced two new quantum
key distribution schemes for optical fiber systems based
on the recently presented idea of Inoue, Waks and Ya-
mamoto [1]. Our new schemes are more efficient and ro-
bust against eavesdropping than other schemes proposed
to date (BLT⊕ is more efficient than IWY for error rates
>
∼ 2-3%). In particular, BLT also has the advantage of
being relatively easy and inexpensive to implement.
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FIG. 1. The IWY parallel-delay element interferometer.
Alice (A) is on left, Bob (B) on right. A controls all phase
information (PMl, and PMm), where the l represents the
“longer” path and m represents the “medium” path (rela-
tive to the “short,” or direct path). A randomly toggles φm
and φl between values of 0 and pi.
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FIG. 2. The BLT series-delay element interferometer. A
is on left, B on right. A controls all phase information by
randomly adding a phase value of 0 or pi to each of the four
temporal superposition locations.
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FIG. 3. Fiber based BB84-like transmitter and receiver. A
is on left, B on right. The phase modulator at A is randomly
toggled between one of four phases: φA ∈ {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2},
and at B between one of two phases: φB ∈ {0, pi/2}.
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FIG. 4. A BLT series-delay interferometer variation with
increased disturbance and reduced potential eavedropper in-
formation. A is on left, B on right. This system increases the
eavesdropping disturbance to as much as 2/5 and reduces E’s
information on the quantum key to a maximum of 1/5.
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FIG. 5. Fraction of transmitted qubits which contribute to
private key when privacy amplification is considered. This
plot clearly shows that the series element idea has a great
advantage over BB84, IWY, or BLT⊕ for error rates les than
about 0.13. (The values presented here assume true sin-
gle-photon QKD and do not consider weak coherent attack
strategies, or the amount of key lost through error reconcili-
ation.)
